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Evidence of Character.
In an action for damages for the wrongful killing of plaintiff's hus-
band, it is proper to exclude evidence offered by defendant to prove his
general reputation as an honest, peaceable, and law-abiding citizen.
EVIDENCE OV CHARACTER AND REPUTATION.
I. The General Principles which
Govern the Admissibility of such
Evidence.- (i) Evidence of char-
acter, or of reputation, which proves
character, can only be offered by
way of rebuttal, either of the legal
presumption in favor of good char-
acter, of prior evidence assailing
character, or of an attack upon it
arising directly or by implication
from the pleadings or form of ac-
tion. This is the cardinal principle
that underlies this branch of the
law of evidence, and it follows nec-
essarily that, in general, evidence
of bad character only is admissible
in chief, and evidence of good char-
acter cannot be given unless it has
first been assailed. The reason of
this is perfectly clear. The law pre-
sumes every man's character to be
good until the contrary is proven;
and as all evidence of good charac-
ter would, therefore, be merely cu-
mulative, it is accordingly rejected
as unnecessary, and as forcing upon
the opposite party a side issue which
he alone has the right to niake.
But this may be rebutted, in com-
mon with all otherpresumptions of
fact, by evidence tending to prove
the contrary; and then evidence
may in turn be offered to rebut the
latter, and so support the character
assailed: Tibbs v. Brown, 2 Grant
(Pa.), 39; McCabe v.- Platter, 6
Blackf. (Ind.), 405; Harm v.Wilson,
28 Ind., 296; Dame v. Kenney, 25
N. H., 318: Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51
Vt., 501.
The normal operation of this rule
is most clearly seen in the'case of a
witness. His character is presumed
truthful, and cannot, therefore, be
proved to be so for the purpose of
corroborating his testimony until it
has been assailed; but when once
this has been done, whether suc-
cessfully or not, evidence of his
reputation for truth is admissible to
rebut that attack: Peo. v. Hulse, 3
Hill, 3o9; Harks v. Peo., 5 Denio,
io3; Braddle v. Brownfield, 9 Watts,
124; Wertz v. May, 21 Pa., 274;
Tedens v. Schumers, 112 Ill. 263;
Com. v. Ingraham, 7 Gray (Mass.),
46. Wherever good character is ad-
missible in chief it is to rebut some
direct or implied attack in the
pleadings or form of action. A
charge of misappropriating funds,
Falkner v. Behr, 75 Ga., 671, of
I Reported in 20 S. W. Rep., 689.
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cruel and disgraceful conduct in a
divorce suit, DuBose v. DuBose, 75
Ga., 753, or of adultery, O'Bryan
v. O'Bryan, 13 Mo., i6; S. C., 53
Am. Dec., 128, will render it com-
petent for the party assailed to
prove his good character,; and it is
also admissible to establish want of
probable cause in malicious prose-
cution: Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush.
(Mass.), 217.
In criminal cases the good char-
acter of the defendant may always
be shown, for the very accusation
under which lie labors is an assault
upon it: Peo. v. Garbutt, 17 Mich.,
9; Hanney v. Com., I6 Pa., 323;
S. C., 9 AtI. Rep., 339.
EMvidence of bad character is, of
course, admissible in all cases to
rebut the presumption of good
character; but it cannot be intro-
duced in cases where the latter is
assailed by the pleadings or form of
action,, .unless evidence has been
given to support it, or unless it has
a direct bearing upon the issue, and
so tends to rebut the averments of
the other side. It cannot be intro-
duced in criminal cases to impugn
the defendant unless he first gives
evidence to prove his character
good; but it can be given to attack
a plaintiff in libel or slander, so as
to mitigate the damages, for it goes
directly to the amount of injury
suffered: Stone v. Varney, 7 Metc.
(Mass.), 86; and to assail the female
in a prosecution for rape, Turney's
Case, 8 S. & M. (Miss.), io4; State
7'. Forshore, 43 N. H., 89, or in se-
duction, Wilson v. Sprowl, 3 Pa.,
49; Stowell v. Beagle, 79 Ill., 257,
because she #sserts her good char-
acter by the action. And in cases
of homicide the defendant may. if
he plead self-defense, offer evidence
of the dangerous character of the
deceased to rebut the presumption
arising from the killing: Abernethy
v. Com., IOI Pa., 322.
(2) Closely connected with this is
the second principle, that evidence
of character can only be given
when it has a direct bearing upon
the issue. It is on this ground that
evidence of the character of the
parties to a civil suit is rejected in
all cases except those in which it is
material, or, as is technically said,
is put in issue: Gebhart 'v. Burkett,
57 Ind., 378.
Evidence of the bad reputation of
a witness for truth has a direct
bearing upon his credibility; evi-
dence of the good character of a
defendant has a direct bearing upon
the question whether or not it is
likely that he would commit the
crime charged; evidence of evil
reputation tends to prove the
amount of injury suffered by a libel
or slander; and evidence of the
character of a murdered man
bears very strongly upon.the ques-
tion whether or not the defendant
had reason to fear injury to life or
limb. All these are, therefore, ad-
missible in proper cases.
(3) A thira principle is that the
evidence of reputation offered must
correspond to the issue to which it
relates, or the particular trait of
character assailed. This is simply
the old rule that evidence must be
confined to the point in issue. When
it is sought to impeach a witness
the issue is as to his veracity, and
the evidence should be confined to
his reputation for truthfulness or,
at the furthest, to his general moral
character, and evidence of a bad
reputation for any specific trait of
character other than that involved
should not be admitted. Certainly,
proof that he was a drunkard or a
fornicator would not prove him a
liar.
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A reputation for dishonesty can-
not rebut a reputation for peace
and quiet; a reputation for unchas-
tity cannot affect a reputation for
honesty; a reputation for untruth-
fulness cannot refute evidence of a
reputation for chastity; and a repu-
tation for quarreling and turbulence
cannot disprove a reputation for
truthfulness. And equally, when
the character of the deceased is in
issue in homicide, no amount of
proof of honesty or dishonesty,
truthfulness or untruthfulness,
chastity or unchastity, can make
him out either a peaceable or a dan-
gerous man; and the inquiry must,
therefore, be strictly confined to his
reputation for peace and quiet: Ab-
ernethy v. Com., Ioi Pa., 322.
(4) The fourth principle is that
evidence of reputation to beadmis-
sible must be general, at least in the
community where the individual
resides oris best known at the time.
It need not, of course, be invariably
from the place of his present resi-
dence, for he may have been there
too short a time to be generally
known; or it may be impossible to
obtain witnesses from that locality.
This is a matter that cannot be re-
duced to inflexible rules, and must
of necessity be largely in the dis-
cretion of the trial court. But it
cannot be proved by reputation cur-
rent only in one or another circle
or clique of his friends, acquain-
tances or neighbors-it must be in
the community at large; and cannot
be proved by evidence of specific
acts, for isolated instances can-
not make a reputation: Rattaree
v. Chapman (Ga.), 4 S. E. Rep.,
684. Upon the same ground rumors
and opinions are inadmissible:
Scott v. Sampson, 8 Q. B. D., 491;
Hussey v. State, 87 Ala,, 121 ; S.
C., 6 So. Rep., 420. But the char-
acter of a man, as proving his fit-
ness or unfitness for a position of
trust, may be attached by proof of
specific acts, though his reputation
may not: Baulec v. R. R., 59 N. Y.,
356.
Just as the place so also the time
of reputation depends largely on
circumstances and rests in the dis-
cretion of the Court. No invariable
rule can be laid down in regard to
it. Of course, it must be reasonable,
and should be as near as possible
to the time of trial, for reputation
may change; and yet it does not,
under ordinary circumstances,
change so rapidly that an interval
of months, or even years, will of
necessity render proof of it at that
time inadmissible. It should, of
course, be ante litem motam, except
in the case of a witness; because
the issue relates to that time, and
the libel or the charge of crime may
have affected it injuriously: Reid
v. Reid, 2 C. E. Green (N. 3.),
1O.
(5) The fifth principle needs no
argument to prove its validity. It
is that evidence of the character of
third parties shall never be given,
unless it is material to the issue.
Evidence of the character of one
under whom the plaintiff claims in
ejectment is inadmissible: Black-
burn v. Holliday, 12 S. & R., 140.
So of an accomplice who is a stran-
ger to the record: Walls v. State,
125 Ind., 4oo; of a woman with
whom defendant lived: Peo. v.
Sweeney, 55 Mich., 586; and of de
fendant's wife in a prosecution for
attempting to levy blackmail by
accusing the prosecutor of seducing
her: McMillan v. State, 6o Ind.,
216. On the trial of a husband for
attempting to murder his wife, evi-
dence that the wife was unchaste is
incompetent: Coin. v. Sapp (Ky.),
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14 S. W. Rep., 8 4. But when the
defendant was assaulted by deceased
and his companion, evidence of the
bad character of the companion is
admissible: Tiffany v. Com., [21
Pa., 165; S. C., 15 Atl. Rep.,
462. And in an action for dam-
ages for an injury occurring
through the negligence of an em-
ployee, the character of the em-
ployee is in issue, as showing neg-
ligence on the part of his employer,
and may be proved: Frazier vz.
R. R., 38 Pa., 104; Cook v. Parham,
24 Ala., 21. See, however, Baulec
v. R. R., 59 N. Y., 356.
(6) The last principle is that
which permits the evidence of good
reputation to be negative. It tests
in sound common sense. As has
been repeatedly said, the best char-
acters are those which are least
talked about; and the less fault
that is found with a man the better
his reputation. Accordingly, evi-
dence of good character may be
shown by the testimony of a wit-
ness that he never heard a person's
reputation discussed, or never
heard anything said against it.
Reg. v. Cary, io CoX, C. C., 25.
(7) It is hardly necessary to add
that the witness to reputation must
show that he is acquainted with it;
though he need not personally
know the individual to whose repu-
tation he testifies. Redden v.
Tefft (Kan.), 29 Pac. Rep., i57;
State v. Turner (S. C.), .i5 S. E.
Rep., 602.
II. The A#plicalicn of these
Principiles to Spiecial Cases. (A)
Proof of Rep utation of Witnesses.
-(i) As was said above, the credi-
bility of a witness' testimony can-
not be supported by evidence that
his character for truth and veracity
is good, until that character has
been assailed by the opposite party;
but when that has been done, evi-
dence of his good character may
then be adduced to rebut it: Rus-
sell v. Coffin, 8 Pick. (Mass.),
143; Harrington v. Lincoln, 4
Gray (Mass.), 563; Heywood v.
Reid, 4 Gray (Mass.), 574; Att-
wood v. Dearborn, i Allen (Mass.),
483; Johnson v. State, 21 Ind.,
329; Brand v. Campbell, 86 Ind.,
516; Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind.,
28; Kitteringham v. Dance, 58
Iowa, 632; Cross v. Rutledge, 8I
Ill., 266; Haines v. Peo., 82 Ill.,
43o ; Tedens i. Schumers, 112 Ill.,
263; Peo. v. Rector, 19 Wend., 569;
Peo. v. Gay, -7 N. Y., 378; Rogers
v. Moore, io Conn., 13; Vernon v.
Tucker, 30 Md., 456; State v.
Cooper, E Mo., 436; State v.
Thomas, 78 Mo., 327; Peo. v. Hulse,
3 Hill, 3o9; Harks v. Peo., 5 Denio,
1o3'; Peo. v. Van Houter, 38 Hun.
(N. Y.), 168; Braddie v. Brownfield,
9 Watts, 124; Werts v. May, 21 Pa.,
274; Turner v. Com., 86 Pa., 54;
R. R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Ala., 168;
Stamper v. Griffin, 12 Ga., 450;
Vance v. Vance, 2 Metc. (Ky.), 583;
Peo. v. Bush, 65 Cal., 129; Saussy
v. R. R., 22 Fla., 327; Morgan v.
State, 88 Ala., 223, S. C., 6So. Rep.,
76r; State v. Jones (S. C.), 7 S. E.
Rep., 296; and it makes no differ-
ence in this regard whether the
attempt at impeaching the charac-
ter is successful or unsuccessful ;
the evidence of good reputation
is equally admissible in either case.
Com. vz. Ingraham, 7 Gray (Mass.),
46; Wilson v. State, i7 Tex. App.,
525. But if evidence of good char-
acter is improperly admitted before
it has been assailed, the judgment
will not be reversed on this ground
alone, as the evidence, being
merely cumulative, could not be
productive of any substantial in-
jury. Green v. State (Tex.), 12 S.
AND REPU
XV. Rep.,'872. If, however, it could
be shown to have in any way
materially affected the result,
this reasoning could not apply, and
the judgment would doubtless be
reversed.
(2) A mere conflict of testimony
is not an attack upon reputation;
and, therefore, is not a sufficient
ground for admitting evidence of
the good reputation of the, witness
whose testimony is contradicted.
A contradiction does not imply
want of truthfulness. Priutt v.
CoX, 21 Ind., 15 ; Russell v. Coffin,
8 Pick. (Mass.), 143; Cupp V. Com.
(Ky.), 7 S. W. Rep., 405; Rushing
v. State (Tex.), 8 S. V. Rep., 807;
Britt v. State (Tex.), 17 S. \V.
Rep., 255; Chic. & Alton R. R. v.
Fisher, 31 Ill. App., 36; Tedens v.
Schumers, 112 Ill., 263. Nor is this
the case even when evidence is
given that the witness has made
material false statements, though
this practically involves a charge
of perjury. Brown v. Movers, 6
Gray (Mass.), 451. But an apparent
exception to this rule was allowed
in Crook v. State, 27 Tex. App.,
198; S. C., Ii S. W. Rep., 444, in
favor of a non-resident witness;
and in Tipton v. State (Tex.), 17
S. W. Rep., 1097, in favor of a
prosecuting witness. See also
Phillips v. State, i9 Tex. App.,
158.
When the witness has been im-
peached by proof of specific acts
which affect his credibility, he niay"
rebut it by proof of good moral
character acquired since the time
of the acts proved. Cent. R. R. &
Banking Co. v. Dodd, 83 Ga., 507.
Contra, Zitzer vz. Berkle, 24 Pa.,
410; Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa., 401.
But the reasoning in the former
case is very cogent, and would seem
to establish a juster rule. "A man
UTATION. 233
may be guilty of immoral acts in
his youth, and may repent and lead
a pure and moral life ever after-
ward. It would be unjust to him
to allow this attack to 'be made
upon him, and not to allow him to
show that since that time he has
established among his neighbors a
good character, such as to render
him worthy of belief in a court of
justice."
The attack which will justify
the admission of evidence of good
reputation need not be made by
direct testimony-it may be during
the cross-examination: State v.
Fruge (La.), io S. Rep., 621. But
a mere attack upon the veracity of
a witness by counsel in argument
is no ground for the admission of
testimony to sustain his reputation
in that regard: Tedens v. Schumers,
112 Ill., 263; Ricks v. State, 19 Tex.
App., 308.
(3) As the point in issue in the
impeachment of a witness is his
credibility, the evidence of reputa-
tion offered must be such as will
affect that, and should consequently
be of his reputation for truth and
veracity. Bank v. Coots, 3 Cr., C.
C., 169; U. S. v. Vansickle, 2 Mc-
Lean, C. C., 219; Taylor v. Clen-
dinning, 4 Kan., 524; Boswell v.
Blackman, 12 Ga., 591; Nugent v.
State, iS Ala., 521 ; State v. Ran-
dolph, 24 Conn., 363; Fryer v.
Bank, I I II., 367; Crabtree v. Kite,
21 Ill., 180; Phillips v. Kingsfield,
19 Me., 375; State v. Bruce, 24 Me.,
71; Bank v. Hobbs, i iGray (Mass.),
250; Webber v. Hanke, 4 Mich.,
198; Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind., 124;
Herzman v. Oberfelder, 54 Iowa,
83; Atwood v. Impson, 5 C. E.
Green (N. J.), 15o; Rudsdill v.
Slingerland, i8 M Iinn., 380; Smith
v. State, 58 Iiss., 867; Hoitt V.
Moulton, 21 -N. H., 586; Boon v.
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Wethered, 23 Tex., 675; Kennedy
v. Upshaw, 66 Tex., 442; S.C., IS.
W. Rep., 3o8; Powers v. Leach, 26
Vt., 270; Spears v. Forrest, 15 Vt.,
437; Crane v. Thayer, 18 Vt., 168;
Gough v. St. John, I6 Wend., 653;
Fowler v. Ins. Co, 6 Cowen, 675 ;
Townsend v. Graves, 3 Paige, 456;
Church v. Drummond, 7 Ind., 19;
Gebhart v. Burkett, 57 Ind., 380;
Crose v. Rutledge, 8I Ill., 267;
State v,. Howard, 9 N. H., 436;
Teese v. Huntingdon, 23 How., 2;
Uhl v. Com., 6 Gratt. (Va.) 706. It
was for a time the prevailing doc-
trine that impeaching testimony of
a witness' reputation should be
confined to this; but the better
opinion would now seem to be that
evidence of bad moral character in
general is equally admissible, as
tending to affect his credibility:
Majors v. State, 29 Ark., II2; Cline
v. State, 51 Ark., 14o; Peo. v. Beck,
58 Cal., 212; State v. Boswell, 2
Dev. (N. C. L.), 209; Gilliam v.
State, i Head (Tenn.), 38; Ward v.
State, 28 Ala., 53; De Kalb Co. v.
Smith, 47 Ala., 407; McInerny v.
Irvin, go Ala., 275; S. C., 7 So.
Rep., 841: Tacket v. May, 2 Dana
(Ky.), 79; Blue v. Kibby, i T. B.
Monroe (Ky.), I95; State v. Hart
(Iowa), 25 N. W. Rep., 99; State
v. Hamilton, 55 Mo., 520; State v.
Breeden, 58 MO., 5o7; State v. Clin-
ton, 67 Mo., 386; State v. Miller,
71 Mo., 59o; State v. Parker (Mo.),
9 S. W. Rep., 728. Even when the
witness is a defendant testifying in
his own behalf: State v. Broderick,
6i Vt., 421; S. C., 17 Atl. Rep., 716;
Keyes v. State, 122 Ind., 527; S. C.,
23 N. . Rep., 1o97; Drew v. State,
124 Ind., 9; S. C., 23 N. E. Rep.,
io98; State v. Day, ioo Mo., 242. In
some States evidence of general
moral character is made admissible
to impeach a witness by express
statute: R. S. Ind., i88i, 5o5, I803;
Parley z. State, 57 Ind., 333; Iowa
Code, 3694; State v. Egan, 59
Iowa, 636.
(4) This impeaching reputation,
however, cannot go beyond proof
of general bad reputation; and can-
not be of specific traits other than
veracity, as chastity: Evans v.
Smith, 17 Am. Dec., 74, n., p. 77;
Bolles v. State, 46 Ala., 204; Hol-
land v. Barnes, 53 Ala., 83; Motes
v. Bates, 8o Ala., 382; Davenport v.
State, 85 Ala., 336; Mclnerny v.
Irvin, 9o Ala., 275; S. C., 7 So.
Rep., 841; Com. v. Churchill, ii
Metc. (Mass.), 538; Peo. v. Yslas,
27 Cal., 63o; Weathers v. Barksdale,
3o Ga., 888; M&riman v. State, 3
Lea (Tenn.), 393; Ford v. Jones, 62
Barb. (N. Y.), 484; Kilburn v. Mul-
len, 22 Iowa, 498; Spears v. Forest,
15 Vt., 435; Cline v. State, 51 Ark.,
140; State v . Larkin, ii Nev., 330;
Gilchrist v. McKee, 4 Watts, 380;
or intemperance: Brindle v. MncI-
vaine, xo S. & R., 282; Hoitt v.
Moulton, 21 N. H., 586; Thayer v.
Boyle, 3o Me., 475; or turbulence
and violence when intoxicated:
State v. Nelson (Mo.), 14 S. -W.
Rep., 712; S. C., IO Mo., 464. It
has sometimes been held, in oppo-
sition to the rule stated above, that
a witness could be impeached by
proof of bad reputation for chastity,
more especially if a woman : State
v. Shields, 13 Mo., 236; State v.
Clawson, 30 Mo. App., 139; Sword
v. Nestor, 3 Dana. (Ky.), 453; R.
R. v. Anthony, 43 Ind., 183; Birm-
ingham Ry. v. Hale, go Ala., 8;
S. C., 8 So. Rep., 142. This latter
distinction, however, is now repu-
diated in Missouri, and such evi-
dence is permitted to impeach
either sex, though the courts con-
fess that it is in opposition to the
general current of authority: State
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v. Rider, 95 Mo., 486; S. C., 8 S.
W. Rep., 723; State v. Shroyer, io4
Mo., 441; S. C., i6 S. W. Rep., 286.
If admissible at all, such evidence
should be confined to cases where
the prosecuting witness, as in rape
and seduction, exposes her charac-
ter to attack by the very nature of
the action; and in such cases it is
really the fact'of chastity, and not
the credibility of the witness, that
is assailed by the evidence of repu-
tation for unchastity.
It is an open question whether
evidence is admissible of other
specific traits of character, if con-
nected with evidence of veracity.
It was so held in Heath v. Scott,
65 Cal., 548; but was rejected in
Cline v. State, 51 Ark., I4O. As
the reputation for truth is the main
point, however, the admission of
additional evidence of other traits,
though perhaps techniically error,
would seem to be harmless.
(5) Further, general reputation
cannot be established by proof of
specific acts, whether elicited by
direct or cross-examination: Glaze
v. Blake, 56 Ala., 379; Moore v.
State, 68 Ala., 36o; Smith v. State,
88 Ala., 73; S. C., 7 So. Rep., 52;
Moulton v. State, 88 Ala., 116;
S. C., 6 So. Rep., 758; Morgan
'v. State, 88 Ala., 223; S. C.,
6 So. Rep., 76r; Walker v. State,
(Ala.), 9 So. Rep., 87; Peo. v.
Bowers (Cal.), I8 Pac. Rep., 66o
(by Code.); Jones v. Duchow, 87
Cal., io9 ; S. C., 23 Pac. Rep., 371 ;
Fox v. Com. (Ky.), i S. W. Rep.,
396; Logsdon v. CoM. (Ky.), 12 S.
W. Rep., 628; State v. Barrett, 40
Minn., 65; S. C., 41 N. W.. Rep.,
459; Muetze v. Tuteur (Wis.), 46
N. W. Rep., 123; Carthaus z,. State
(Wis.), 47 N. W. Rep., 629; Peo. v.
Gibson, 4 N. Y. Suppl., 170; S. C.,
6 N. Y. Crim. Rep., 390; Gilpin v,
Daly, 12 N. Y. Suppl., 448; S. C.,
58 Hun. (N. Y.), 61o; Moore v.
Moore, 73 Tex., 382; S. C., II S.
V. Rep., 396; State v. Garland, 95
N. C., 671; State v. Gordon, 3 Iowa,
41o; State it. Sterrett, 71 Iowa, 386;
S. C., 32 N. V. Rep., 387; State v.
McGee (Iowa), 46 N. W. Rep., 765;
nor can it be proved by evidence of
reputation among a portion only
of the community: Peo. v. Mark-
ham (Cal.), 3o Pac. Rep., 62o, cit-
ing Bates v..Barber, 4 Cush. (Mass.),
1o7; and Knode v. Williamson, 17
Vall., 586. See Winter v. R. R.
(Iowa), 45 N. W. Rep., 737.
Au impeachment of reputation
cannot be rebutted by proof that
this reputation is not justified by
the life of the witness: Hollings-
worth v. State (Ark.), 14S. W. Rep.,
41- But when a witness has testi-
fied to facts that would tend to im-
peach his character, he may be
cross-examined as to other facts
tending to prove the same trait:
Peo. v. Harrison, 53 N. W. Rep.,
725 ; and the rule does not exclude
evidence of specific acts which im-
pair credibility directly; it only
forbids them to be used as proof of
reputation.
(6) The evidence of a witness's
reputation should geperally have
reference to his character at or near
the time when his testimony is
given, and in the neighborhood
where he then resides: City of
Aurora v. Cobb, 21 Ind., 492; Chance
v. Indianapolis R. R. Co., 32 Ind.,
472; Stratton i. State, 45 Ind.,
468; Rawles v. State, 56 Ind., 433;
State v. Johnson, 41 La. An., 574;
Long v. State (Neb.), 36 N. W.
Rep., 31o; State v. Ward (Iowa),
35 N. W. Rep., 617; Com. v. Houri-
gan (Ky.), 12 S. W. Rep., 55o-
And the witness should ordinarily
be from the same communuity ai
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER
the person to whose character he
testifies: Churton v. Roggen, 67
Barb. (N. Y.), 124; Martin.v. Mar-
tin, 25 Ala., 2o ; Dupree 'v. State,
33 Ala., 38o; Davis v. Franke,
33 Gratt. (Va.), 413; Kelley v.
Proctor, 41 N. H., 137; State v. Cox,
67 Mo., 392.
These rules are not iron-clad,
however. It was never meant that in
all cases the inquiry should be re-
stricted to the present abode of the
witness, or to the very day, week,
month, or even year, of the exami-
nation. All that is necessary is
that the evidence should relate to
the place where he is best known,
not where, as in the case of a recent
removal, he is an entire, or cbm-
parative, stranger; and it should
date from a time which, under all
the circumstances, is reasonably
near to the time of the examination:
Coffelt v. State, i9 Tex. App., 436;
Coates v. Sulau (Kans.), 26 Pac.
Rep., 720; State v. Potts, 78 Iowa,
656; S. C., 43 N. W. Rep., 534.
An interval of two months since
a change of residence will not
render evidence of reputation at
the former home incompetent:
Pape v. Wright, ii6 Ind., 502;
S. C., x9 N. E. Rep., 459; nor
one of eighteen months: Thur-
mond v. State, 27 Tex. App., 347;
nor of four years, where there is no
evidence of the character borne at
the new residence '(and the old is
therefore presumed unchanged?) :
Sleeper v. Van Middlesworth, 4
Denio, 43r. When a witness has
been imprisoned for seven years in
a penitentiary at a distance from
her old home, her previous charac-
ter can still be testified to by those
who then knew it: for even grant-
ing that her character had changed
during that time, they could not
know of it: Sage v. State, 127 Ind.,
15; S. C., 26 N. . Rep., 667. So,
too, when a witness has been long
removed from the State, his prior
character may be testified to by
those who knew it, though no evi-
dence was offered of his present
character; for witnesses to that
could not be obtained: Watkins v.
State, 82 Ga., 231; S. C., 8 S. R.
Rep., 875. But evidence of this
kind should be received with cau-
tion, and is not entitled to as much
weight as evidence of present char-
acter: Mitchell v. Com., 78 Ky.,
221 ; S. C., 39 Am. Rep., 227; My-
natt v. Hudson, 66 Tex., 66; Lum
v. State, ii Tex. App., 483 ; Nomes
v. Statelor, 17 11., 454; Rathbun
v. Ross, 46 Barb. (N. Y.), 137. It
may be rebutted by proof of present
character: Mynatt v. Hudson,
supba,; or, if too distant in time,
under the circumstances, may be
rejected altogether. When a wit-
ness has lived in one place for five
years next preceding a trial, and is.
well known there, he cannot be
impeached by witnesses from places
wheie he formerly lived: State v.
Potts, 78 Iowa, 656; S. C., 43 N.
W. Rep., 534; Webber v. Hanke,
4 Mich., 198; nor can one who has
lived in the same county for
twenty years be impeached by evi-
dence of a former bad character,
acquired while living in another
State: State v. Parker (Mo.), 9S.
W. Rep., 728. Even two years may
be too long an interval to permit
the introduction of evidence of for-
mer character, without proof of
that possessed at present: Mitchell
v. Com., 78 Ky., 221; S. C., 39 Am.
Rep., 227. In general, however,
the question as to reasonableness
of time and place rests in the dis-
cretion of the trial court, and its
ruling will not be disturbed unless
it produce manifest injustice: Hol-
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liday v. Cohen, 34 Ark., 707; Cline
v. State, 51 Ark., i4o; S. C., io S.
V. Rep., 225; Snow v. Grace, 29
Ark., 131; Rucker v. Beaty, 3 Bush.
(Ky.), 7o; Manion v. Lambert, io
Bush. (Ky.), 298 ; State v. Howard,
9 N. H., 485; Aurora v. Cobb, 21
Ind., 492 ; Stratton v. State, 45
Ind., 458; R. R. Co., v. Richardson,
66 Ind., 43 ; Kelly v. State, 6r Ala.,
19; Buse v. Page, 32 Minn., iii;
Willard v. Goodenough, 30 Vt.,
393; Wood v. Matthews, 73 Mo.,
477-
When evidence of the bad repu-
tation of a witness at his present
home has first been shown, it may
be supported by evidence of bad
character at his former residence
also: State v. Espinozei, 2o Nev.,
209; Peo. v. Abbott, 19 Wend., 200;
McMahon v, Harrison, 6 N. Y., 443;
Packet Co. v. McCool, 83 Ind., 392;
and when the present'character has
been shown to be bad, evidence of
previous good character may be
given: Bank v. Hobbs, ii Gray
(Mass.), 250.
(7) A basis for the admission of
evidence ofreputation must be laid
by asking the witness if he knows
it: Peo. v. Rodrigo, 69 Cal., 6Oi;
State v. Wheeler, 104 N. C., 893;
S. C., io S. E. Rep., 491; for if he
is not acquainted with it, of course
he cannot testify to it: Clapp v.
Engledow, 72 Tex., 252; S. C., 1o
S. W. Rep., 462; Redden v. Tefft
(Kan.), 29 Pac. Rep., 157. But it
is not necessary that the witness
should be personally acquainted
with the person .whose reputation
is in question : State v. Turner
(S. C.), 15 S. E. Rep., 602; nor that
be should have heard it talked
about: Flemister v. State (Ga.),
7 S. E. Rep.. 642; First Nat'l Bk.
of Oakland V. Wolff, 79 Cal., 69;
S. C., 21 Pac. Rep., 55i; Nat'l
Bank of Troy v. Serwen, 19 N. Y.
Suppl., 277; for, as a general rule,
the better a man's reputation the
less is said about him: Reg. v.
Cary, io Cox, Cr. Cas., 25; Davis
v. Foster, 68 Ind., 258; Davis v.
Frank, 33 Gratt. (Va.), 413; Hadjo.
v. Gooden, 13 Ala., 718; Childs v.
State, 55 Ala., 28. His knowledge
of character, however, should date
prior to the suit, and if it be only
derived from inquiries or informa-
tion received/fostliemr vzolam, his
evidence should be rejected: Peo.
v. Fong Ching, 78 Cal., 169; S. C.,
20 Pac. Rep., 396; Griffith v. State,
9o Ala., 583; S. C., 8 So. Rep., 812;
Douglas v. Tousey, 2 Wend., 352;
Reid v. Reid, 17 N. J. Eq., ioi.
(8) The testimony of a witness is
not necessarily to be rejected be-
cause his character is -proved bad.
"One who has generally a reputa-
tion as a liar may, and often does,
tell the truth." Peo. v. O'Brien
(Mich.), 36 N. W. Rep., 225; Fuller
v. Rounceville, 29 N. H., 555;
Sharp v. State, 16 Ohio St., 218;
Belcher v. Conner, i S. C., 88;
Green v. Cochran, 43 Iowa, 553;
Jernigan v. Wainer, 12 Tex., i89;
Johnson v. Brown, 51 Tex., 65,
State v. Larson (Iowa), 52 N. V.
Rep., .539. But if the impeach-
ment is successful the witness, in
civil actions at least, should be cor-
roborated to be believed: Smyth
v. Oliver, 31 Ala., 39; Adams v.
Adams, 2 C. IE. Green (N. J.), 324;
Watson v. Roode, (Neb.), 46 N. W.
Rep., 491.
(9) When the impeaching wit-
ness has testified that he knows the
general reputation of the one who
is sought to be impeached, it is
proper to ask if he would believe
him on his oath, as this does not
call for a mere opinion, but for
what is the necessary consequence
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of his evil reputation: State v.
Johnson (Kan.), 19 Pac. Rep., 749;
Hudspeth v. State (Ark.), 9 S. W.
Rep., i; State v. Christian (La.),
Ii So. Rep., 589; contra, Cline v.
State (Ark.), io S. W. Rep., 225;
S. C., 5i Ark., 14o; Griffin v. State
(Tex.), 9 S. W. Rep., 45 9 . If, how-
ever, the question be asked in such
a manner that it appears to call for
the witness' individual opinion,
based on his own knowledge, rather
than on general reputation, it is
clearly improper: Benesch v.
Waggner, 12 Colo., 534; S. C., 21
Pac. Rep., 706; Benesch v. Mitchel-
son, 12 Colo., 539; S. C., 21 Pac.
Rep., 708; and as it is not neces-
sary to the impeachment of the
witness that the question be asked
at all, (Mitchell v. State (Ala.), io
So. Rep., 518), it is probably safer
to omit it altogether.
When a witness has testified to
the bad reputation of another, it is
proper to ask him on cross-exam-
ination to name the persons from
whom he heardsuch reports: Rob-
bins v. Spencer (Ind.), 22 N. R.
Rep., 66o; Peo. v. Mather, 4 Wend.,
230; Lower v. Winters, 7 Cow., 268.
And where a witness has voluntar-
ily testified to his own immoral
acts, it is proper to ask a witness
who testifies to the good character
of the former whether he would
allow him to visit his family, for
the purpose of ascertaining the
latter's estimate ofa good character:
State v. Brown (N. C.), 6 S. R.
Rep., 568.
(IO) The number of witnesses to
character rests in the sound discre-
tion of the Court: Cox v. Pruitt,
25 Ind., go. Ordinarily, one will
- not be sufficient to impeach: Waf-
ford v. State, 44 Tex., 439; at least,
to the extent of requiring a special
instruction: Rider v. State (Tex.),
9 S. W. Rep., 688.
But witnesses to character testi-
fying in rebuttal of impeachment
may be properly limited to the
number of impeacbing witnesses:
Hollywood v. Reed, 57 Mich., 234.
(Ii) When a party to a civil ac-
tion, or a defendant in a criminal
prosecution, testifies in his own be-
half, his character may be assailed
equally with that of any other wit-
ness: Pratt v. Andrews, 4 N. Y.,
493; Tedens v. Schumers, 112 Ill.,
263; State v. Rainsbarger, 79 Iowa,
745; S. C., 45 N. W. Rep., 302;
Jones v. State (Ala.), ii So. Rep.,
399; State v. Parker (Mo.), 9 S.W.
Rep., 728. By so doing he brings
himself within all the rules laid
down as to other witnesses, and he
may be shown to have a bad repu-
tation not merely for truth and
veracity, but for general morality
as well: Peo. v. Bentley (Cal.), I8
Pac. Rep., 799; Mitchell v. State
(Ala.), io So. Rep., 518; Lockard
v. Com. (Ky.), 8 S. W. Rep., 266;
Hasson v. Com. (Ky.), ii S. W.
Rep., 286; Corn. v. Hourigan (Ky.),
12 S. W. Rep., 550; Crump v.
Com. (Ky.), 20 S. W. Rep., 39o;
State v. Grant, 79 Mo., ii3; State
v. Palmer, 88 Mo., 568; State v.
Rider (Mo.), 8 S. W. Rep., 723;
State v. Day, 100 Mo., 242; S. C.,
12 S. W. Rep., 365; Peck v. State
(Tenn.), 6 S. W. Rep., 389; but
this reputation goes only to his
credibility as a witness, and has
not the slightest bearing upon the
main issue of the suit. Evidence
of bad character, thus rendered
competent cannot be used to prove
guilt, but only to shake the defend-
ant's credit: State v. Broderick, 61
Vt., 421; S. C., 17 Atl. Rep., 716;
Adams v. Peo., 9 Hun. (N. Y.), 89;
State v. Robertson (S. C.), i S. B.
Rep., 443; Peo. v. Beck, 58 Cal.,
212; State v. Beal, 68 Ind., 345;
Keyes v. State, 122 Ind., 527; S. C.,
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23 N. E. Rep., 1097; Drew v. State,
124 Ind., 9; S. C., 23 N. B. Rep.,
1098.
(12) When attesting witnesses to
a will are dead, and the will is im-
peached on the ground of fraud in
procuring it, which fraud is im-
puted to the witnesses, evidence of
their good character may be given:
Stephenson v. Walker, 4 ESp., 50;
Provis v. Reed, 5 Bingh., 435. So
the bad character of a subscribivg
witness may be shown to rebut the
presumption arising from his sig-
nature: Boylan v. Meeker, 4 Dutch.
(N. J.), 274; and this will in turn
render competent evidence of his
good character in rebuttal: Black
v. Ellis, Riley (S. C.), 73. On the
same principle, when book entries
are offered in evidence, the charac-
ter of the person who made them
may be attacked: Crouse v. Miller,
io S. & R., 155; Baiber v. Bull,
7 W. & S., 391; Tomlinson v.
Borst, 30 Barb. (N. Y.), 42.
(I3) As a party cannot impeach
his own witness, he cannot ordi-
narily offer evidence of his bad
character; but when the witness is
one whom the law obliges him to
call, as the subscribing witness to
a will, he is not bound by his testi-
mony, if he prove hostile, but may
impeach his credit by proof of bad
reputation: Hardin v. Hays, 9 Pa.,
I5I; Williams v'. Walker, 2 Rich.
Eq., 29[; Olinde v. Saizan, io La.
An., 153; Dennett v. )Ow, 17 Me.,
19; Thornton v. Thornton, 39 Vt.,
122; Diffenderfer v. Scott (Ind.), 32
N. E. Rep., 87.
(B) Proof of Repiutation of Par-
ties to Civil Acions.-(i) As a gen-
eral rule, evidence of the character
of either party to a civil suit is inad-
missible as having no bearing upon
the issue, exceptwhen he offers him-
self as a witness, and then goes only
to his credibility: Johnson v. Wells,
Fargo & Co., 6 Nev., 224; Church
v. Drummond, 7 Ind., 17; Ins. Co.
v. Sheppard, 85 Ga., 751. It makes
no difference in this regard whether
the act charged be indictable or not:
Att.-Gen. v. Bowman, cited in note
to Huntley v. Luscombe, 2 Bos. &
Pul., 532; Cornwall v. Richardson,
Ry. & M., 305; Houghtaling v.
Kilderhouse, i N. Y., 530; Geb-
hart v. Burkett, 57 Ind., 378. But
if an attack be made upon it by the
pleadings, or if the form of action
is such that it becomes material to
the issue, reputation is then said to
be in issue, and may be proved:
Smets v. Plunket, i Strobh.
(S. C. L.', 372; Gutzwiler v. Lack-
man, 23 Mo., 168; Rogers v. Troost,
5r Mo., 470; Gebbart v. Burkett,
supra; Williams v. Haig, 3 Rich.
L. (S. C.), 362. A party to a suit
may offer evidence of his good char-
acter when he is charged, by a plea
in recoupment, with misappropriat-
ing funds: Falkner v. Behr, 75.Ga.,
671. In an action for malpractice,
the defendant's character as a phy-
sician is in issue: Carpenter v.
Blake, io Hun. (N. Y.), 358. And
the plaintiff's character is in issue
on the question of damages in
an action for crim. con., but not
that of the wife: Pratt v. Andrews,
4 N. Y., 493.
(2) On the other hand, evidence
of the character of either party is
not admissible in an action where
it can have no possible logical in-
fluence upon the determination of
the issue. It is, therefore, not ad-
missible in an action for the wrong-
ful killing of another: Vawter v.
Hultz (the principal case) iMo.),
20 S. V. Rep., 689. In an action
for assault and battery it is not
competent, either in mitigation
of damages or to rebut malice:
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Willis v. Forest, 2 Duer (N. Y.),
310; Corning v. Corning, 6 N.
Y., 97; Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa.,
424; Thompson v. Church, i Root
(Conn.), 312; Givens v. Bradley,
3 Bibb. (Ky.), 195; Reed v. Kelly,
4 Bibb. (Ky.), 4or ; Pratt v. State,
56 Ind., 179; Gebhart v. Burkett,
57 Ind.i 378; Elliott v. Russell, 92
Ind., 526; Sturgeon v. Sturgeon
(Ind.), 30 N. E. Rep., 805; Pok-
riefka v. Mackurat (Mich.), 51 N.
W. Rep., o59. Neither is such
evidence admissible in an action
of trespass, Cummings z). Crawford,
88 Ill., 32; Russell v. Shuster, 8
W. & S., 308; for false representa-
tions, Gough v. St. John, 16 Wend.,
646; or trover, although the tasti-
mony practically charges the de-
fendant with embezzlement: Wright
v. McKee, 37 Vt., 161. This also
seems to be the rule in bastardy
proceedings: Walker v. State, 6
Blackf. (Ind.), i ; Rawles v. State,
56 Ind., 433; Sidelinger v. Buck-
lin, 64 Me., 371; although in Walker
v. State it was held that the char-
acter of the plaintiff was put in
issue.
This same rule, with less reason,
is held to apply to charges of fraud;
and the general doctrine is that a
mere charge of fraud does not put
the character in issue either in ac-
tions ex contractu: Atkinson v.
Graham, 5 W. (Pa.), 411; Nash v.
Gilkeson,- 5 S. & R., 352; Anderson
v. Long, io S. & R., 55; Battles v.
Laudenslager, 84 Pa., 446; Fowler
v. Ins. Co., 6 Cow. (N. Y.), 673;
Smets v. Plunket, i Strobh. (S. C.
L.), 372; or ex delicto: Gough v.
St. John, i6 Wend. 647; Woodruff
v. Whittlesey, Kirby (Conn. , 62.
The early case of Ruan v. Perry,
3 Caines (N. Y.), 120, stood on
much firmer ground when it held
that "in actions of tort, and espe-
cially charging a defendant with
gross depravity and fraud, upon cir-
cumstances merely, as was the case
here, evidence of uniform integrity
and good character, is often the
only testimony which a defendant
can oppose to suspicious circum-
stances;" but this was overruled by
Gough v. St. John, sufira, and has
since been wholly disregarded. Yet
it would seem to propose the fairer
doctrine, at least in cases of circum-
stantial evidence; and this view is
supported by Dawkins v. Gault, 5
Rich. (S. C.), i53, and Werts v.
Spearman, 22 S. C., 200. -But the
weight of authority is still so
strongly against it that there can
hardly be claimed to be a conflict
of decisioni, even though the ma-
jority opinion may seem a mis-
taken one.
(3) There is a conflict of decision
on the question whether character
is in issue in an action for divorce:
Ward v. Thompson, 5 Port. (Ala.),
382; Washburn v. Washburn, 5 N.
H., 195; Berdell v. Berdell, 8o Ill.,
604; Dwyer v. Dwyer, 2 Mo. App.,
17. It has been said that it is not
even put in issue by the charge of
adultery: Humphrey v. Humphrey,
7 Conn., 116; Evans v. Evans (Ky.),
20 S. W. Rep., 605; but such a
charge certainly is an attack upon
the character of the defendant for
chastity, and on the principles laid
down above would authorize re-
butting evidence. The better opin-
ion, therefore, would seem to be
that evidence of good character is
admissible in such a case.. It is
also admissible where the libel
charges cruel and disgraceful con-
duct. Du Bose v. Du Bose, 75 Ga.
753. It is not competent, however:
to show reputation for good or bad
temper. Evans v. Evans (Ky.), 20
S. W. Rep., 6o5.
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(4) The rule that does not admit
proof of character in a civil action
on a criminal charge rests on a per-
version of reasoning, or rather a
wanton disregard of the plainest
principles of justice and common
sense. It is perfectly proper to ex-
clude such evidence where it has no
bearing on the issue, as in most
civil actions; but these are not
purely civil actions because they
take that form. They are none the
less criminal in their nature, and
assail the character of the defend-
ant not one whit less seriously
because they involve a pecuniary
and not a physical penalty. The
real point at issue is whether the
defendant was guilty of the act
complained of; and since he has
the right to show his good character
in every criminal prosecution, as
bearing upon this issue: Hanney
v. Com., ii6 Pa., 32I3; S. C., 9 Atl.
Rep., 339, he ought not to be de-
prived of this right because the
prosecutor has adopted a different
form of action. The mere form
has nothing to do with the merits
of the case; the real question is,
what is the point in issue? And if
that involves a criminal charge, as
bastardy, rape, adultery, or em-
bezzlement, the defendant should
be allowed to give evidence of his
good reputation as tending to rebut
the charge. The only reason urged
against the adoption of such a rule
is that then the other party mustbe
allowed to prove bad character:
Cornwall v. Richardson, Ry. & M.,
305. Vhy not? If the fact is
material, what objection can there
be to controverting it? and it no
more raises a side issue than any
other conflict of testimony in re-
gard to facts. Such evidence is
admissible in malicious prosecu-
tion, and the same reasoning should
apply to similar cases. "One
charged with a crime is not obliged
to rest upon a presumption of good
character. In favorem libertatis
he-may prove the fact, if he can, by
a weight of evidence far more
effective than any mere presump-
tion. A plaintiff in a suit for a
malicious prosecution, has the bur-
den of proving that the prosecution
was without probable cause. In
defending against the prosecution
he would have the right to show
his good reputation, although his
character was not attacked other-
wise than incidentally by the pros-
ecution itself. The same incidental
attack upon his character neces-
sarily appears in the suit for the
malicious prosecution,:" McIntire
v. Levering, 148 Mass., 546; S. C.,
2o N. E. Rep., 191. It is to be
hoped that the courts will soon
abrogate this, as they have so many
other arbitrary rules of the common
law, and adopt the view which rea-
son and justice alike commend,
that in all actions on a criminal
charge, whatever their form, the
defendant shall be allowed to prove
his good character.
(5) There are, as has been said,
certain actions which necessarily
involve the character of one or
both of the parties, either as mate-
rial to the main issue, or as bearing
upon the matter of damages. These
are actions for breach of promise of
marriage, libel and slander, mali-
cious prosecution, and seduction.
(a) Breach of Promise.-This
action does not immediately in-
volve the character of the parties,
and, therefore, evidence of reputa-
tion is not admissible as a defense:
Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa., 401; but
as the plaintiff practically asserts
her character to be good by bring-
ing the action, and as one of the
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main purposes of the suit is to
recover damages for the loss of
reputation occasioned by the fault
of the defendant, the plaintiff's
character thus becomes material to
the question of damages. It may,
therefore, be proved bad by way of
mitigation: Van. Storch v. Griffin,
71 Pa., 240; Foulks v. Selway, 3
]E sp., 236; Irving v. Greenwood, i
C. & P., 350; Bench v. Merrick, i
Johns. Cas. (N. Y.), II6; Willard
v. Stone, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 22; Pal-
mer v. Andrews, 7 Wend., (N. Y.),
142; Kniffen v. McConnell, 3o N.
Y., 285; Burnett v. Simpkins, 24
Il., 264. When seduction is joined
with the breach, proof of plaintiff's
character before her seduction is
equally admissible: Boynton v. Kel-
logg, 3 Mass., I89; Green v. Spen-
cer, 3 Mo., 318.
(b) Libel and Slander.-F vidence
of the good character of the plain-
tiff is not rendered admissible by a
libel or slander imputing a crime,
in accordance with the doubtful
rule stated above, although defend-
ant gives evidence to prove the
truth of the charge: Cornwall v.
Richardson, Ryan & M., 305;
Houghtaling v. Kilderhouse, i N.
Y., 530; Mathews v. Hunter, 9 N.
H., 146; and ii fortiori is this trte
when the act charged is not crim-
inal: Harding v. Brooks, 5 Pick.
(Mass.), 244; Howland v. Geo. F.
Blake Mfg. Co. (Mass.), 3 1 N. ]E.
Rep., 656. But proof of his bad
character is admissible on the ques-
tion of damages, on the principle
that" a reputation already damaged
in the very point in controversy
is not so valuable, commercially
speaking, as a reputation which
is unspotted :" Drown v. Allen, 91
Pa., 393; Conroe v. Conroe, ii
Wright, 198; Moyer v. Moyer, 13
Wright, 210; Wolcott v. Hall, 6
-Mass., 518; Bodwell v. Swan, 3
Pick. (Mass.), 378. It may be ad-
mitted under the general issue:
Bennett v. Hyde, 6 Conn., 24; Foot
v. Tracy, i Johns. (N. Y.), 46; Pad-
dock v. Salisbury, 2 Cow. (N. Y.),
811; Hallowell v. Guntle, 82 Ind.,
554; Duval v. Davey, 32 Ohio St,
604; Anthony v. Stephens, i Mo.,
254; Henry v. Norwood, 4 Watts,
347; Steinman v. McWilliams, 6
Pa., 17o; Sawyer v. Eifert, 2 N. &
McC. (S. C.), 5ii; Richards. v.
Richards, 2 M. & R., 557; Leicester
v. Walter, 2 Camp., 251; Scott v.
Sampson, 8 Q. B. D., 491.; or
generdl issue and justification, but
not justification alone: Stone 7.
Varney, 7 Metc. (Mass.), 86; Pad-
dock v. Salisbury, supra; Root v.
King, 7 Cow., 613; Vick v. Whit-
field, 2 Hayw., 222; Dewit v. Green-
field; 5 Ham., 275; Bastland v.
Caldwell, 2 Bibb. (Ky.), 21; Sawyer
v. Hopkins, 9 Shepley, 268; Snow
v. Converse, 3 Conn., 345; Drown
v. Allen, 91 Pa., 393. When the
plea denies the libel, evidence of
reputation is of course inadmis-
sible: Forshee v. Abrams, 2 Iowa,
571; and so if it is not pleaded by
way of justification or mitigation :
Halley v. Gregg (Iowa), 48 N. W.
Rep., 974. The reputation proved
must of course correspond to the
libelous or slanderous charge: Pad-
dock v. Salisbury, 2 Cow. (N. Y.),
8ri; Leonard v. Allen, ii Cush.
(Mass.), 241; Duval v. Davey, 32
Ohio St., 6o4; Smith v. Buckecker,
4 Rawle, 295; Conroe v. Conroe, 47
Pa., 198; Moyer v. Moyer, 49 Pa.,
27o; Drown v. Allen, 91 Pa., 393-
When the slanderous charge is of
being a thief, evidence of being a
prostitute is not admissible: Doug-
* las v. Tousey, 2 Wend. (N. Y.), 352.
Nor is reputation of being an atheist
admissible when the slander is of
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being a perjurer: Ross v. Lapham,
14 Mass., 279. But when the libel
imputes political treachery to plain-
tiff, and consequent perjury to de-
fend himself against such charges,
the defendant, under a plea of truth
in justification, may show not only
the general reputation of plaintiff
for truth and veracity, but also that
he is generally regarded in the
community as a person unworthy
of belief in political matters: San-
ford v. Rowley (Mich.), 52 N. W.
Rep., i19.
(c) Mfalicious Prosecution.- As
the burden of proof in this action
lies upon the plaintiff to prove
want of probable cause, evidence
of his good character is admissible
to rebut the presumption against
him. The same facts that would
raise a strong suspicion against a
person of notoriously bad character,
even in the mind of a cautious and
reasonable man, would make a
slighter impression if they pointed
to the guilt of a man of good repu-
tation: Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush
(Mass.), 2r7; McIntire v. Levering,
148 Mass., 546; S. C., 2o N. E. Rep.,
191; Scott v. Fletcher, i Overton
(Tenn.), 488; Miller v. Brown, 3
Mo., 127; S. C., 23 Am. Dec., 693;
Israel v. Brooks, 23 Ill., 575; Bliz-
zard vu. Hays, 46 Ind., 166; Wood-
worth v. Mills, 61 Wis., 44- But if
the arrest is on a complaint founded
on defendant's dwn knowledge,
character can be of no avail. It is
onlyadmissible when the complaint
is founded on information and be-
lief: Skidmore v. Bricker, 77 Ill.,
164. On the other hand his bad
character is admissible against him
to mitigate damages and to aid in
proving probable cause: Pullen v.
Glidden, 68 Me., 559; Miller v.
Brown, supra; Gregory v. Cham-
bers, 78 Mo., 294; Winebiddle v.
Porterfield, 9 Pa., 137; Rodriguez
v. Tadmire, 2 Esp., 271; but it is
not sufficient of itself alone to es-
tablish probable cause: Newsam v.
Carr, 2 Starkie, 69.
(d) Seduction.-The character for
chastity of the seduced female is
already impeached by the fact of
seduction, and is therefore in issue:
State v. Lockerby (Minn.), 52 N. W.
Rep., 9o8; Wilson v. Sprowl, 3 Pa.,
49; Haines v. Sinclair, 23 Vt., io8;
Stowell v. Beagle, 79 Ill., 525;
White v. Murtland, 71 Ill., 250;
Hoffman v. Keirerer, 44 Pa., 452;
Dodd v. Norris, 3 Camp., 520, but
not that of the defendant: Delvee
v. Boardman, 20 Iowa, 446; nor
of the plaintiff, if a parent suing for
a daughter's seduction: Dam v.
Wyckoff, 18 N. Y., 45. The char-
acter of plaintiff's faily may be
shown to augment damages, for
the social standing of all its mem-
bers is lowered by the seduction:
Wilson v. Sprowl, sutra; McAnley
v. Birkhead, 13 Ired. (N. C. L.), 28;
Thompson v. Clendinning, i Head
(Tenn.), 287; Parker v Monteith, 7
Ore., 277; Andrews v. Askey, 8 C.
& P., 7; Kendrick v. McCrary, ii
Ga., 603; contra, Haines v. Sinclair,
23 YL, io8. The character of de-
fendant's family may be proved to
show that the plaintiff was not
derelict in allowing his daughter to
associate with him: Parker v. Mon-
teith, sup ra. Specific immoral
acts cannot be shown as tending to
establish a bad reputation for chas-
tity: State v. Rogers (Mo.), 18 S.
W. Rep., 976.
(C) ProofoflReputation in Crimi-
nal Cases.-(i) Character of Prose-
cutor.-Of course the reputation of
the prosecuting witness for truth
may be proved in the same manner
and subject to the same rules as
the reputation of any other witness.
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But there are certain criminal accu-
sations which permit the prosecu-
ting witness to be impeached by
proof of other traits of character.
These traits, however, are such as
go directly to the merits of the
prosecution. Thus the character
of the prosecutrix for chastity is in
issue in a case of rape: State v.
Foreshore, 43 N. H., 89; State v.
Knapp, 45 N. H., 148; Turney's
Case, 8 S. & M. (Miss.), lo4; State
v. Reed, 41 La. An., 581 ; S. C., 7
So. Rep., 132; and in'seduction:
State v. Lockerby (Minn.), 52 N. W.
Rep., 908.
In a prosecution for assault and
battery with intent to kill, when
defendant has claimed that he acted
in self-defense, and has introduced
evidence of threats made by the
prosecuting witness, and assaults
made by him on other persons, the
State may prove in rebuttal the
general reputation of the prosecu-
ting witiiess for peaceableness:
Bowles v. State (Ind.), 28 N. E.
Rep., i15.
The good character of the prose-
cuting witness for truth and ver-
acity cannot be proved until it has
been assailed: Cupp v. Com. (Ky.),
7 S. W. Rep., 4os; Rushing v. State
(Tex.), 8 S. W. Rep., 807.
(2) Character of Defendant.-As
has been seen, a defendant who has
offered himself as a witness may be
impeached by evidence of bad
moral character; but this evidence
goes only to his credibility, and
does not have the least tendency to
prove him guilty of the crime
charged, for evidence showing that
a man is morally capable of com-
mitting a crime is not proof that
he actually committed it: Peo. v.
Benedict, 21 N. Y. Suppl., 58. In
no other case can the character of
the defendant be attacked until he
has put it in issue by offering evi-
dence in support of it: State v.
Ellwood (R. I.), 24 Atl. Rep., 782;
Petty v. Com. (Ky.), 15 S. W. Rep.,
1O59. But that evidence need not
be direct. It may be brought out
on cross-examination: Reg. v. Gad-
bury,8 C. & P., 676; Reg. v. Shrimp-
ton, 3 C. & K., 373-
Failure to prove good character
raises no presumption against the
defendant: Peo. v. Bodie, i Dana
(Ky.), 282; Peo. v. White, 24 Wqnd.
(N. Y.), 520; State v. Dockstader,
42 Iowa, 432; State v. Oikill, 7 Ired.
(N. C.), 251.
Proof of the defendant's good
moral character is admissible in
his behalf in all criminal trials,
without regard to the nature of the
offense charged. It is not a de-
fense, but a substantive fact, to be
considered by the jury -in connec-
tion with all the other facts in the
case, as tending to show that it is
unlikely that such a person would
have committed the crime charged:
Hardtke v. State, 67 Wis., 552;
Remsen v. Peo., 43 N. Y., 6; State
v. Donovan, 6r Iowa, 278. "Good
character is an important fact with
every man; and never more so
than when he is put on trial charged
with an offense which is rendered
improbable in the last degree by a
uniform course of life wholly in-
consistent with any such crime.
There are cases where it becomes a
man's sole dependence, and yet
may prove sufficient to outweigh
evidence of the most positive char-
acter. The most clear and con-
vincing cases are sometimes satis-
factorily rebutted by it, and a life
of unblemished integrity becomes
a complete shield of protection
against the most skillful web of
suspicion and falsehood which con-
spirators have been able to weave.
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Good character may not only raise
a doubt of guilt which would not
otherwise exist, but it may bring
conviction of innocence. In every
criminal trial it is a fact which the
defendant is at liberty to put in
evidence; and being in, the jury
have a right to give it such weight
as they think it entitled to:"
CooLEY, J., in Peo. v. Garbutt, 17
Mich., 9; Felix v. State, iS Ala.,
72o; Dupree v. State, 33 Ala., 380;
Harrison v. State, 37 Ala., 154;
Hall v. State, 40 Ala., 698; Spring-
field v. State (Ala.), ii So. Rep.,
250; Kistler v. State, 54 Ind., 400;
McQueen v. State, 82 Ind., 72;
Wagner v. State, 107 Ind., 71; S. C.,
7 N. B. Rep., 896; 57 Am. Rep., 79;
Hopps z. Peo., 31 Ill., 388; Peo. v.
Ashe, 44 Cal., 288; Peo. v. Bell, 49
Cal., 485; State v. Turner, 19 Iowa,
r44; State v. Gustafson, 50 Iowa,
194; Coleman v. State, 59 Miss.,
484; Schaller v. State, 14 MO., 502;
State v. O'Connor, 31 Mo., 389;
State %. McMurphy, 52 Mo., 251;
Kee v. State, 28 Ark., 155; Griffin
v. State, 14 Ohio St., 55; Harring-
ton v. State, 19 Ohio St., 264; State
v. Beebe, 17 Minn., 241; Lee zv
State, 2 Tex. App., 339; Lockart v.
State, 3 Tex. App., 567; State v.
Henry,5 Jones (N. C. L.), 65; State
v. Wells, Coxe (N. J.), 424;. Peo. v.
Mead, 50 Mich., 233; S. C., 15 N.
XV. Rep., 95; Peo. 'v. Moett, 23 Hun.
(N. Y.), 6o; Stover v. Peo., 56 N. Y.,
315; Cathcart v. CoM., 37 Pa., io8;
Kilpatrick v. Com., 8i Pa., 198;
Becker v. Com. (Pa.), 9 Atl. Rep.,
5 o; State v. Edwards, 13 S. C., 30;
Com. v. Leonard, 140 Mass., 479;
S. C., 4 N. R. Rep., 96; Com. v.
Wilson (Mass.), 25 N. E. Rep., i6;
State v. Daley, 53 Vt., 442; Peo. v.
Hancock (Utah), 25 Pac. Rep.,1o93;
U. S. v. Jackson, 29 Fed. Rep., 503;
U. S. v. Jones, 31 Fed. Rep., 718;
17
R. v. Stannard, 7 C. & P., 673;
State v. Donohoo, 22 XV. Va., 761;
Shropshire v. State, 81 Ga., 589;
S. C., 8 S. R. Rep., 4oo; Hodgkins
v. State (Ga.), 15 S. E. Rep., 695;
Holland v. State (Ind.), 31 N. .
Rep., 359; State v. Levigne (Nev.),
30 Pac. Rep., io84; Peo. v. Formosa,
i6 N. Y. Suppl., 753; Peo. v. Swee-
ney (N. Y.), 3o N. R. Rep., 1005;
(aff. S. C., 59 Hun. (N. Y.), 619 ; 13
N. Y. Suppl., 25); Peo. v. Harrison,
53 N. W. Rep., 725. Its force is, of
course, to be determined by the
jury from all the attendant circum-
stances: Cancemi v. Peo., 16 N. Y.,
Sor, though its effect is naturally
greater when the evidence is cir-
cumstantial: Jackson v. State
(Wis.), 51 N. W. Rep., 89. It is
not requisite that the case should
be doubtful in order to justify its
admission: U. S. v. Gunnell, 5
Mackey (D. C.), 196; State v. Barth,
25 S. C., 175; State v. Howell, oo
Mo., 628; Long v. State, 23 Neb.,
33; S. C., 36 N. V. Rep., 31o; John-
son v. State (Neb.), 5i N. W. Rep.,
835; for evidence of character
alone may be sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt: Peo. v. Pollock,
4 N. Y. Suppl., 298; S. C., 5t Hun.
(N. Y.), 613; Bacon v. State, 22 Fla.,
5i; Klehn v. Territory, I Vash. St.,
584; S. C., 21 Pac. Rep., 31; Heine
v. Com., 91 Pa., 145; Hanney v.
Coin., ti6 Pa., 323; 8. C., 9 At].
Rep., 339. It has even been
claimed that character was suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption of
guilt arising from the possession
of recently stolen property: Clack-
ner z. State, 33 Ind., 4r2; State v.
Kennedy, 88 Mo., 34r, or to con-
clusively establish innocence in
doubtful cases; but these claims
are against the great weight of au-
thority: Vagner v. State, 107 Ind.,
71; Cole v. State (Miss.), 4 So. Rep.,
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character must be prior to the com-
mission of the alleged crime:
Graham v. State (Tex.), 13 S. W.
Rep., io3.
When the evidence of guilt is
direct, proof of good character goes
only to its credibility: Stover v.
Peo., 56 N. Y., 315; Peo. v. Shep-
ardson, 49 Cal., 629; Peo. v. Bell,
49 Cal., 485; State v. Alexander, 66
Mo., 148; and when that proof is
clear and positive it cannot pre-
vail against it: State v. Turner, 19
Iowa, 149; State v. McMurphy, 52
Mo., 251; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush.
(Mass.), 295; State v. Levigne, 17
Nev., 435; State v. Douglass (Kan.),
24 Pac. Rep., iiiS; U. S. v. Mians,
42 Fed. Rep., 579; Peo. v. Spriggs,
ii N. Y. Suppl., 433; S. C., 58
Hun. (N. Y.), 6o3; Peo. v. Sweeney,
13 N. Y. Suppl., 25; S. C., 59 Hun.
(N. Y.), 619; aff., 30 N., E. Rep.,
oo5; Peo. v. Drown, 14 Y. V.
Suppl., 740; Peo. v. Brooks kN. Y.),
30 N. E. Rep., 189; aff. S. C., 15
N. Y. Suppl., 362.
Of course, ;when defendant has
offered evidence of good character,
it may be rebutted: State v. PFope,
100 To.,2 347; S. C, 13 S. W. Rep.,
490.
Evidence of good character "nay
be negative. The best character is
that which is least talked P'3out:
Reg. v. Cary, IO Cox C. C., 25;
Hussey'v. State, 87 Ala., 121; S.
C., 6 So. Rep., 420; State v. Lee,
22 Minn., 407; S. C., 21 Am. Rep.,
796; Gandolfo v. State, ii Ohio St.,
114; State v. Nelson; 68 Iowa, 208.
Evidence of the moral character
of the accused is admissible to de-
termine the grade of the offense
in homicide: Carroll v. State, 3
Humph. (Tenn.), 315; and to aid
the Court in determining the sen-
tence to be imposed: State v. Sum-
mers (N. C.), 4 S. E. Rep., 120.
.When the defendant offers evi-
dence, not of general moral char-
acter, but of specific traits, it
should correspond with the trait
involved in the offense, or it will
be inadmissible. Kahlenbeck v.
State, 119 Ind., 118; S. C., 21 N. E.
Rep., 46o; Walker v. State, 102
Ind., 502; Peo. t,. Stewart, 28 Cal.,
395; Kee v. State, 28 Ark., 155;
State v. Kiley, 43 Iowa, 294; State v.
Pearce, 15 Nev., 188; State v. King,
78 Mo., 555; State v. Emery (Vt.),
7 AUt. Rep., 129. In prosecution
for homicide, defendant may show
his reputation for peace and qui-
etude: State v. Sterrett, 68 Iowa,
76; State v.. Cross, 68 Iowa, i8o;
Morgan v. State, 88 Ala., 223;- S. C.,
6 So. Rej., 761; Gibson v. State, 89
Ala., 121; S. C., 8 So. Rep, 98;
even where the charge is of murder
by poisoning, for poisoning involves
an assault: Hall v. State (Ind.),
31 N. E. Rep., 536; but not for
honesty, truth or integrity:' Peo. v.
Cowgill (Cal.), 29 Pac., 228; or that
he was a good soldier: Peo. v. Gar-
butt 17 Mich., 9. In a prosecution
for assault and' battery, reputation
for truth and veracity is irrelevant:
Morgan v. State, 88 Ala., 223; S.
C., 6 So. Rep., 761. In a prosecu-
tion for larceny, the reputation of
the defendant for honesty may be
proved: State v. Bloom, 68 Ind.,
54. Evidence offered in rebuttal
should meet the proof it is in-
tended to rebut; and when the ac-
cused in a prosecution for adultery
gave evidence of good character, it
was held reversible error to admit
evidence that he "was foolishly
fond of women;" for such does not
prove a reputation for adultery or
fornication: Cauley v. State (Ala.),
9 So. Rep., 456.
Evidence of specific acts is not
admissible: State v. Rogers (Mo.),
iS S. W. Rep., 976; Hussey v.
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State, 87 Ala., 12r; S. C., 6 So.
Rep., 420; Alexander v. Com., 1o5
Pa., i; except on cross-examina-
tion, for the purpose of testing the
witness' estimate of character, or
to prove his testimony inconsistent
with facts known to him: State
r,. Merriman (S. C.), 12 S. E. Rep.,
b19.
(3) Character of Deceased in
Cases of Homicide.-When the de-
fendant pleads self-defense, he may
introduce evidence of the violent
and dangerous character of the de-
ceased: Abbott v. Peo., 86 N. Y.,
46o; State v. Field, 14 Me., 248; S.
C., 31 Am. Dec., 52; Ripley v.
State, 2 Head (Tenn.), 217; Aber-
nethy v. Com., ioi Pa., 322; Frank-
lin v. State, 29 Ala., 19; Perry v.
State (Ala.), io So. Rep., 65o; Field
v. State, 47 -Ala., 6o3; Jackson v.
State, 77 Ala., I8; State v. Chand-
ler, 5 La. An., 489; S. C., 52 Am.
Dec., 599; State v. Robertson, 3o
La. An., "340; Cotton 'v. State, 31
Miss., 5o4; State v. Keene, 5o Mo.,
357; State v. Bryant, 55 Mo., 75;
State v. Elkins, 63 Mo., 159; State
v. Hayden, 83 Mo., 198. The mere
fact that he possessed such a char-
acter, however, is not enough to
justify its admission in evidence,
without proof that it was known to
defendant, or that he made the
first assault upon- the latter: May
v. Peo., 8 Col., 2xo; Lang v. State
(Ala.), 4 So. Rep., 193; Ty. v. Harper,
I Ariz., 399; S. C., 25 Pac. Rep.,
528; Cannon v. Peo. (Ill.), 30 N. E.
Rep., 1027; King v. State (Ark.),
19 S. W. Rep., 11o; Trabune v.
Com. (Ky.), 17 S. W. Rep., 186;
Garner v. State, 28 Fla, 113; S. C.,
9 So. Rep., 835; State v. Downs, 91
Mo., ig; State v. Labuzan, 37 La.
An., 489; State v. Janvier, 37 La.
An., 645; State z. Jackson, 37 La.
An., 896; State z. Taylor (La.), i i
So. Rep., 132; State v. McCarthy
(La.), 9 So. Rep., 493; Evers v.
State (Tex.), 2o S. W. Rep., 744.
The mere bad character of the de-
ceased cannot, of itself, effect the
guilt of the accused: Chase v. State;
46 Miss., 633; State v. Keene, 50
Mo., 357; Corn. v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa.,
386; Prickett v. State, 22 Ala., 39;
S. C., 58 Am. Dec., 25o; State v.
Hogue, 6 Jones (N. C. L.), 383;
State v. Thawley, 4 Harr. (Del.),
562. The decision of the question
whether a sufficient basis has been
laid for the introduction of de-
ceased's character rests largely in
the discretion of the trial judge;
the uncorroborated testimony of a
single witness, who is contradicted
by others, is not sufficient: State z'.
Ford, 37 La. An., 443.
This evidence is inadmissible
when the defendant does not plead
self-defense, but denies the killing,
Manning v. State 'Wis.), 48 N. W.
Rep., 209; when there was no hos-
tile demonstration on his part to-
ward defendant, nor any reason for
the latter to believe himself in peril;
State v. Mitchell, 41 La. An., 1073;
S. C., 6 So. Rep., 785; King v State,
9o Ala., 612 ; S. C., 8 So. Rep., 856,
and when the defendant is the ag-
gressor. De Arman v. State, 71
Ala. 351; Bond v. State, 21 Fla.,
738; State v. Rose, 47 Minn., 47;
S. C., 49 N. XV. Rep., 404. IEvi-
dence of specific acts of violence
cannot be given: State v. Parker,
(Mo.), 9 S. W. Rep., 728; King v.
State, 65 Miss., 576; S. C., 5 So.
Rep., 97; fnd evidence of violent
character many years before in a
foreign country, is inadmissible.
May v. Peo., 8 Col., 210.
The prosecution cannot show the
peaceable character of the deceased
until it has been attacked: Ben v.
State, 37 Ala., 1o 3 ; Peo. v. Ander-
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son, 39 Cal., 704 i Pea. v. Bezy, 67
Cal., 223; but when the defendant
has been convicted on direct proof,
the admission of such evidence is
harmless error. Webb v. Com.,
(Ky.), 12 S. W. Rep., 769. When
attacked, the attack may be rebutted
by proof of a peaceable and quiet
disposition: Hussey v. State, 87 Ala.,
121; S. C., 6 So. Rep., 420; Davis
v. Peo., 114 Ill., 86; S. C., 29 N. E.
Rep., 192, but the rebutting evi-
dence must meet the direct, and
proof of a violent disposition is not
met by evidence that deceased had
not the character of being a bad
boy. The two traits are not the
same. Martin v. State (Ala.) 8 So.
Rep., 858.
D. The character of a house, as
a nuisance, a bawdy house, etc.,
may be shown by evidence of the
reputation of the persons who fre-
quent it, or the reputation in which
it is held. State v. Bunnell, 29
Wis., 435; Betts v. State, 93 Ind.,
375; Whitlock v.,State (Ind.), 30
N. E. Rep., 934; State v. Fleming,
(Iowa), 53 N. W. Rep., 235.
[NoTE.-Very instructive and in-
teresting articles on this general
subject, containing a number of
cases not cited here, will be found
in 3o Cent. L. J., 241; 31 Cent. L.
J., 229; 3A . &E. En. of Law, i1o-
n8.]
A-RDEMUS STEWART.
SMITH V. SMITH,' SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF
MASSACHUSETTS.
NMon-exbert Obinion- Testamentary Capiacity.
Onthe trial of an issue whether the testator was of sound mind, a
witness who had observed the ,mental and physical condition of the tes-
tator for twenty years, but who was neither an attesting witness to the
will, an attending physician, nor an expert in matters of mental condition,
was asked "whether, from the general appearance of the testator, he
considered him capable of making a contract, or of transacting important
business." Held, that the question called for an opinion on the mental
condition of the testator, and was properly excluded.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF NON-EXPERT TESTIMONY TO SHOW MENTAL
INCAPACITY.
The history of the development ticipate the requirements of new
of legal principles and rules of pro- phases of fact.
cedure shows the impossibility of The broad rule of evidence which
formulating such rules as shall an-'- confines the testimony of witnesses
'32 N. E. Rep., 348.
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to facts alone, and gives to the jury
the sole right to draw the infer-
ences suggested by the facts, has its
source in the danger of prejudicing
the interest of a party to the cause
by swaying the jury by opinions
relative to the facts expressed by
persons unconnected with him:
Best Ev., 495. The difficulty in
applying this rule in strictness
arises from two causes: First, the
growth of learned sciences and of
special branches of knowledge; and
second, the vagueness which is in-
herent in the distinction between
matter of fact and matter ofopinion.
In the first case it is patent that a
necessity has arisen, and has at
no time been more imperative
than at present, to call as wit-
nesses men skilled in the various
departments of knowledge, for the
purpose of informing the jury as to
the proper deductiohs and infer-
ences to be drawn from given facts
according to the light of science,
concerning which men having no
special training are ignorant.
In the second case, it is impossi-
ble in many instances to admit evi-
dence of the facts in question with-
out letting in at the same time the
opinion of the witness upon those
facts. "In all supposed statements
of fact the witness really testifies,
consciously or unconsciously, to
the opinion formed by his judg-
ment upon the presentment of his
senses. Statement of opinion is
therefore necessarily involved in
statement of fact." Whart. Ev., P4 15.
To attain the highest justice in any
given case the best evidence must
always be obtainable and admissi-
ble. When, in answer to the ques-
tion, "What is the best evidence ?"
we discover that to admit what we
have found,will infringe upon a rule
of procedure, justice demands, not
that evidence be castaside, northat
the rule be abrogated, but that an
exception or modification of the
rule be formulated.
In Omychund v. Barker, i Atk.,
19, Lord HARDWICKE said: "The
judges and sages of the law have
laid it down that there is but one
general rule of evidence-' the best
the nature of the case will admit.'"
The testimony of non-expert wit-
nesses in matters of opinion may
be divided as follows:
(I) Where in stating the facts an
opinion is expressed ezizecessitate,
as. where a witness is desired to
describe a sound, a color, an ap-
pearance, the identity of one ob-
ject or thing with another, ques-
tions of value, etc.
(2) Where the witness gives his
opinion as to a matter depending
upon special knowlege, having
stated the facts upon which he
bases his opinion (Whart. Ev.,
; 515); as the apparent extent
of suffering of an individual to
whom the witness was nurse:
Heddles v. Chicago & N. W. Rwy.
Co. (Wis.), 46 N. IV., p. 5 (1891);
the safety or convenience of high-
ways, the witness being familiar
with highways and their use:
Laughlin v. StreetRwy., 62 Mich.,
220; the effect of liquor on one
with whom the witness is familiar:
Cole v. Bean, I Ariz., 377; People
v. Monteith (Cal.), 14, P. 373; as
to values, rentals, etc. : Wood z.
Baylis, io N. Y. S., 62; Chamber-
lain v. Dunlop, 8 N. Y. S., 125.
In issues devisavit vel non,
and in actions to determine the
validity of deeds, there has been
much conflict and fluctuation of
authority as to the admissibility
of non-expert testimony to de-
termine the mental capacity of
the testator or grantor Insanity,
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while in many cases the expert's
peculiar province of inquiry, yet is
shown in so many ways that are
plain to the ordinary observer, that
expert testimony is not only un-
necessary, but the best evidence
obtainable is undoubtedly that of
those who have had special oppor-
tunities for observing the individ-
ual by their association with him.
Non-expert testimony in cases of
insanity is divided into (a), that of
attesting witnesses of wills; and
(b), that of all other non-experts.
The admissibility of testimony
of the first class is not questioned
by any authority, but is confined to
the attesting witnesses of wills
alone, excluding the testimony of
the attesting witnesses of deeds,
who are on the same plane as all
other non-experts: Egbert v. Eg-
bert, 78 Pa., 326. The subscribing
witnesses to a will may always give
their opinions concerning the san-
ity or insanity of the testator at
the time he signed the will in their
presence, "whether they happen to
be attending physicians, nurses,
children, or chance strangers." The
distinction is made because their
signatures to the will are an asser-
tion that the testator was of sound
mind when he signed it: Poole v.
Richardson, 3 Mass., 330; May v.
Bradlee, 127 Mass., 414; Com. v.
Brayman, 136 Mass., 414; Culon v.
Haslam, -7 Barb., 314; Clapp v.
Fullerton, 34 N. Y., 19o; Brand v.
Brand, 39 How. Pr. Rep., 193; Van
Huss v. Rainbolt, 42 Tenn., .39;
Unes v. Lee, et al., 47 Md., 321;
Potts v. House, 6 Ga., 334; Irish v.
Smith, 8 S. & R., 573; Logan v.
McGinnis, 12 Pa., 27; Eckert v.
Flowry, 43 Pa., 46. Many cases
decide that the opinions of the-
subscribing witnesses as to the ca-
pacity of the testator are admissi-
ble without first receiving testi-
mony of the facts upon which the
opinion is based: Poole v. Richard-
son, 3 Mass., 330 (1807); Com. V.
Brayman, 136 Mass., 438 (1884);
Logan v. Maginnis, 12 Pa., 27
(1849); Eckert v. Flowry, 43 Pa.,
46 (1862), Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa.,
216 (1867); Williams v. Lee, el al.,
47 Md., 32r; Van Huss v. Rainbolt,
elal., 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.), 139; Potts,
el al., v. House. 6 Ga., 334.
The conflict of authority is upon
the admission of witnesses who are
neither experts nor subscribing wit-
nesses to wills to give their opinion
as to mental capacity.. That the
best authority favors the com-
petency of such evidence there
is not a doubt. In State v. Pike,
49 N. H., 408, 4o9, DOil, J., in his
dissenting opinion, says: "That
in England no express decision of
the point can be found, for the
reason that such evidence has al-
ways been admitted without ob-
jection. It has been universally
regarded as so clearly competent
that it seems no English lawyer
has ever presented to any court
any objection, question or doubt in
regard to it. But in Wright v'.
Tatham, 5 Cl. & Fin., 670; S. C., 4
Bing., N. C., 489, the question was
involved in such a manner and the
number and strength of the judicial
opinions were such as to make that
case an authority of the greatest
weight in favor of the competency
of the evidence. In his dissenting
opinion, filed in Boardman v.Wood-
man, 47 N. H., 144, the same judge
says: 'Since the decision in Dewitt
v. Bailey, 9 N. Y., 371, was Over-
ruled in the same case, 17 N. Y.,
340, there has been almost perfect
unanimity of authority in favor of
such testimony. The supposition
that such testimony was not re-
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ceived in the English common law
courts is erroneous : Eagleton v.
Kingston, 8 Ves., Jr., 439, 449, 450;
452; Tatham v. Wright, 2 Kuss. &
Myl., , pp. 375, 376 of Ingraham's
edition; Lowe v. Joliffe, i 'V. Bl.,
365; Attorney-General v. Pamther,
3 Br. C. C., 441, 442; King v. Ar-
nold, i6. St. Tr., 695, 7o6, el seq.
King v. Terress, i9 St. Tr., 885, 923,
et seq.' "
In the United States Supreme
Court non-expert opinion in issues
of insanity is admitted. In the
case of Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Lathrop, iii U. S., 6[2, the
Court decided that the answer of a
witness, who had previously testi.
flied as to the appearance of the
person whose sanity was in ques-
tion, to the question, "What was
the impression left upon your mind
by the conduct, actions, manners
expressions and conversation of
P.?" that "he was crazy and
didn't know what he was doing,"
and "I thought he was out of his
head," was properly admitted in
evidence. "Whether an individual
is insane is not always solved by
abstruse metaphysical speculation,
expressed in the technical language
of medical science. The common
sense, and, we may add, the natural
instincts of mankind, reject the
supposition that only experts can
approximate certainty upon such
a subject. While the mere opinion
of a non-professional witness, predi-
cated upon facts detailed by others,
is incompetent as evidence upon an
issue of insanity, his judgment,
based upon personal knowledge of
the circumstances involved in such
an inquiry, certainly is of ',alue,
because the natural and ordinary
operations of the human intellect
and the appearance and conduct of
insane persons, as contrasted with
the appearance and conduct of per-
sons of sound mind, are more or
less understood and recognized by
every one of ordinary intelligence
who comes in contact with his
species. The extent to which such
opinions should influence or control
the judgment of the court or jury
must depend upon the intelligence
of the witness, as manifested by
his examination, and upon his op-
portunities to ascertain all the cir-
cumstances that should properly
affect any conclusion reached."
See also Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S.,
430, 437, elseq.; Parkhurst v. Hors-
ford (C. C. D. Oregon, 1884), 21
Fed. Rep., 827.
The New York Rule.-F. S. Rice,
Esq., in his recently published
work on "Evidence," at p. 348,
cites the New York rule as being
the "most satisfactory, and has the
additional advantage of being well
understood and settled beyond
cavil bya long line of adjudication."
The rule as accepted is laid down
in Clapp. v. Fullerton, 17 N. Y.,
340 (I866), that where non-profes-
sional witnesses, who did not attest
the execution of a will, are exam-
ined as to matters within their own
observation, bearing upon the com-
petency of the testator, they may
characterize, as in their opinion
rational or irrational, the acts and
declarations to which they testify;
but the examination must be
limited to their conclusions from
the specific facts they disclose, and
they cannot be permitted to express
their opinions on the general ques-
tion whether the mind of the
testator was sound or unsound.
Real v. State, 42 N. Y., 270; Howell
v. Taylor, fi Hun., 214; Arnold's
Will, 14 Hun., 525; Bell z. McMas-
ters; 29 Hun., 272 ; Ross' Will, 87
N.Y., 514; Holcomb v. Holcomb,
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95 N. Y., 316; People v. Conroy,
97 N. Y., 62. This rule confines
the testimony of each witness to
the designation as rational or
otherwise those particular acts of
the individual which have come
under his personal observation. By
excluding testimony as to the
general issue, the jury are permitted
to determine the question by con-
sidering the conclusions drawn by
each witness from the facts observed
by him.
The Connecticut Rule.-In Shan-
ley's Appeal, decided on November
1, 1892, in the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut, the action
of the lower court in admitting the
question, whether from the wit-
ness' observation of the testatrix
he could say she was of sound
mind, was approved by ANDRXWS,
C. J., quoting the opinion of
LooMIs, J., upon the same question
in Sydleman v. Beckwith, 43 Conn.,
9. "It is in all cases important,
with a view to confirm the opinion,
that the witness should be able to
state such facts as will show pre-
sumptively that his opinion is well
founded. But it is not quite cor-
rect to say that the opinion of a
witness is entitled to consideration
only so far as the facts stated by
him sustain the opinion, unless the
,proposition is understood to in-
clude, among the facts referred to,
the acquaintance of the witness with
the subject-matter, and his oppor-
tunities for observation. The very
basis upon which, as we have seen,
this exception to the general rule
rests, is that the nature of the sub-
ject-matter is such that it cannot
be reproduced or detailed to the
jury precisely as it appeared to the
testator at the time." The distinc-
tion between the rules is that in
any case the New York rule will
not permit non-expert testimony
upon the general issue, while the
Connecticut rule measures the
opinion .the witness may give .by
his acquaintance and opportunities
for observation. (See opinion in
Shanley's Appeal. sufra.) Al-
though the authority given prefers
the New York rule, yet it is difficult
to see that its operation will be
widely different from that of the
Connecticut rule. In a case like
that of Shanley's Appeal, where the
acquaintance and opportunities for
observing the testatrix .extended
over a considerable period, testi-
mony that her acts and conduct
within that period were rational or
irrational is no less than direct tes-
timony of-sanity or insanity. The
advantage of the New York rule is
that it still preserves the jury in
their capacity as triers of the issue,
and enables them, as has been said,
to form an opinion from the con-
clusions drawn by each witness
from the facts observed by him.
In few of the States, however, do
the reported cases indicate any-
thing further than that the excep-
tion to the broad rule of evidence
is recognized, and witnesses who
are not experts may state their
opinions after giving the facts upon
which they are based. Whletber
these opinions must be given ac-
cording to the Connecticut or New
York rules cannot be ascertained.
In Pennsylvania the courts seem
to lean to the admission of testi-
mony of the general issue based
upon knowledge of particular facts.
Thus in Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa.,
342, the Court said: "In Pennsyl-
vania it has always been the rule
that after a non-professional wit-
ness has stated the facts upon which
his opinion is founded he is per-
mitted to state his opinion as to the
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sanity or insanity of the testator."
See also Rambler v. Lyon, 7 S. and
R., go; Urgan v. Small, ii S. and
R., 34T; Titlow v. Titlow, 4 P. F. S.,
216; Dickinson v. Dickinson, Ix P.
F. S., 401; Bank v. Wirebach's
Executors, 12 WV. N. 15o; Swails,
Appellant, v. White, i Adv. Rep.,
856 (1892). In the case of Conn.
Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, iiI U. S.,
612, the court favor testimony of
the general issue. See also 4i Tex.,
125; 20 Nev., 333; Crim. Law
Mag., 72; 51 Vt. 296; 61 Vt., 534;
Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H., 227; 9
R. I., 377.
Favoring the New York rule, see
44 Iowa, 229; 5 Blackf. (Ind.), 217;
56 Ind., 343; 69 Ind., io8; 75 Ind.,
5rI; 123 Ind., 337; io9 Ill., 69; 71
Ala., 385; 59 Cal., 392.
The 1llassachisells Rule.-In
Massachusetts, the case of Poole v.
Richardson, 3 Mass., 330 (1807), the
court permitted the subscribing
witnesses to the will to give their
opinions as to the sanity of the
testator, and permitted other wit-
nesses to testify to the appearance
of the testatbr, and to any particular
facts from which the state of his
mind'might be inferred, but not
merely their opinion or judgment.
In commenting upon the case, Doe,
J., in State v. Pike (49 N. H., 399),
says: "There is reason to suspect
that the only point ruled in this
case was that the witnesses were
allowed to give their opinions when
they stated the particular facts from
which the. state of the testator's
mind was inferred by them." This
case is the corner-stone upon which
the Massachusetts courts have built
their rule, and it is certain that in
subsequent cases the error has been
perceived and regretted. In Bax-
ter v'. Abbott, 7 Gray. 71. 79,
TuoMAS, J., said: "If it were a
new question I should be disposed
to allow every witness to give his
opinion subject to cross-examina-
tion upon the reasons upon which
it is based, his degree of intelli-
gence and his means of observa-
tion." Some of the later cases
indicate a tendency to escape to
some extent the evil effects of the
rule by the circuitous method of a
mere technical distinction. Thus
in Nash v. Hunt, 116 Mass., 237
(1874), the Court (WELS, J.), pro-
nounced that the answer of a
witness that "he perceived noth-
ing unusual or singular respect-
ing 'the testator's mental condi-
tion I was competent, not being an
expression of opinion as to condi-
tion of the mind itself, but only of
its manifestation in conversation."
Again, in Commonwealth v. Sturti-
vant, I7 Mass., 122, 133, a witness
was permitted to give "the concla-
sion of fact to which his judgment,
observation and common know-
ledge has led him in regard to a
subject-matter which requires no
special learning or experiment, but
which is within the knowledge of
men in general."
And in Com. v. Brayman, 136
Mass., 438 (1884), COLBURN, J., de-
cided that a person of ordinary in-,
telligence, who was familiarly ac-
quainted with an individual, might
testify whether within a given time
he has failed mentally or physi-
cally, but might not give his opin-
ion upon the facts upon which this
conclusion is based. It seems that
this opinion is self-contradictory.
To say that a man has failed men-
tally or physically within a given
time is not a conclusion of fact, but
a conclusion from fact, and is a
matter of opinion just as much as
to describe a sound or color. In
McCarmel v. Wildes, 153 Mass.,
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487 (1891), it was permitted to ask
an executor whether he bad ob-
served any fact which led him to in-
fer any derangement of intellect,
with the qualification that he
was to state facts only. The nat-
ural conclusion would be that
this decision sounded the note of
emancipation from the bondage
of the rule, and the decision
of Smith v. Smith, in 1892, cer-
tainly may be the subject of legiti-
mate surprise. In State v. Pike,
the Court in commenting upon
Poole v. Richardson, says: "If the
Court had been aware that this rul
ing overturned all the authorities
and the uniform practice in Eng-
land and America from the begin-
ning of the common law to that day,
it is not to be presumed that the
ruling would have been made with-
out a formal opinion reduced to
writing by some member of the
Court, formally delivered and for-
mally reported, giving some reason
for the innovation. If they had
been conscious of the novel and
revolutionary character of the pre-
cedent, they would not have intro
duced it: so summarily and incon
siderately."
When, in 1820, the eastern coun-
ties of Massachusetts became the
S.tate of Maine, the rule of the
Massachusetts courts was adhered
to. In Wyman v. Gould, 47 Me.,
159 t1859), it was held that an ex-
pert only can be permitted to state
how a party "appeared," in respect
to soundness or unsoundness of
mind. In Snow v. Boston &
Maine, 65 Me., 230, however, non-
expert opinion was held to be ad-
missible where it is founded upon
knowledge open to all, and is the
result of personal knowledge, and
relates to the ordinary affairs of
life, such as the value of property,
the appearance or identity of per-
son, etc. And in Fayette v. Ches-
terville, 77 Me., 28, the Court said:
"The tendency in our practice has
been to allow witnesses not experts
a good deal of latitude in the ex-
pression of opinion short of declar-
ing their judgments upon the point
and directly in issue." Thus, in
Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me.. 410,
a witness was permitted to say that
she observed no failure of mind
and nothing peculiar. The ten-
dency of the Maine decisions do, it
is true, tend toward a recognition
of the exception to the rule of ex-
clusion, but as yet they strive to
adhere to the old rule, bending it as
circumstances may require.
In New Hampshire the courts ex-
cluded all non-expert opinion until
the decision of Hardy v. Merrill, 56
N. H., 227 (1875), which overruled
the decisions of Boardman v.Wood-
man, 47 N. H., 12o, and State v.
Pike, 49 N. H., 399. In the latter
case a strong dissenting opinion
was filed by Doz, J., which is
quoted freely, supra. From the
cases cited in the learned opinion
of FOSTER, C.J., in Hardy v. Mer-
rill, it appears that,notwithstanding
the decisions above cited, that the
Massachusetts exception to the
universal rule never was really es-
tablished in New Hampshire, as the
case of Hamblett v. Hamblett, 6
N. H., 333 (1833), which in Board-
man v. Woodman was called the
"corner-stone of the established
usage," not only does not support
the doctrine, in whose aid it was
invoked, but is in conflict with the
earlier cases of State v. Ryan (1811);
Trial of Daniel D. Fanner (1821);
Trial of Amos Furnal (1825); State
v. Conay (i83o); see Hardy v. Mer-
rill, 56 N. H., 236, et seq.
Texas is named by the text-
